In September 1931, Sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the domestic price level the official goal of its monetary policy, actually the only country that so far has adopted such an explicit price level target. Starting from the issues and concepts familiar from research and policy experience in the 1990s of inflation targeting -as contrasted to price level targeting -this paper examines the evolution of the Swedish price level targeting in the 1930s. We bring out a number of similarities and differences between price stabilization in the 1930s and in the 1990s. 
behalf of the Government that the Riksbank was relieved from its legal obligation to convert its notes into gold on demand. After explaining the developments leading to this step, the Minister stated that the policy of the Riksbank should "now be aimed at, using all means available, preserving the domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona."
By this statement Sweden became the first country to make the stabilization of the level of domestic prices the official goal of its monetary policy; actually the only country that did so in the interwar period.
According to contemporary economists, Sweden adopted Knut Wicksell's program of price stabilization.
In modern parlance, the Riksbank became the first central bank to introduce price level targeting explicitly. To our knowledge it remains the only central bank that has taken such a step so far. This paper analyzes the evolution of the Swedish experiment of price level targeting in the 1930s. 2 The paper is organized in the following way. First, we explain why price level stabilization was made the norm for monetary policy by accounting for the events leading up to the September 1931 declaration.
Second, following a brief account of Swedish economic performance in the 1930s, we account for the development of the monetary program of September 1931 from its start until 1937. Finally, we conclude.
The recent international experience of inflation targeting -as contrasted to price level targeting -is the main source of inspiration for our study. 3 We thus base our analysis on issues and concepts familiar from present research and debate on the proper conduct of central bank policy. Consequently, we look upon the Swedish experiment of price level targeting in the 1930s from the perspective of the experience of inflation targeting in the 1990s.
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A price stability target can serve as a nominal anchor, aiming at coordinating inflation expectations as well as providing a commitment mechanism to avoid the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, see e.g. Mishkin (1998) . The modern view on optimal delegation of monetary policy may be summarized in three recommendations. First, the political authorities should define a clear goal for monetary policy, preferably price stability. This goal should be given a legal backing. Second, the central bank should be given operational independence in order to be able to fulfil the goal assigned by the political authorities.
Third, the central bank should be held accountable to the political bodies for the conduct of monetary policy. In our opinion, the 1930s was a period of trial-and-error in monetary policy framing involving the Riksbank, the Banking Committee of the Parliament (the Riksdag), the Government, more precisely the Ministry of Finance, and the economics profession as well as other actors -quite so because the Riksbank and its principal, the Riksdag, had no previous experience of price level targeting. Being pioneers in this field, the monetary authorities had to learn how to design a policy of price stabilization.
When discussing
The Swedish experience of price stabilization in the 1930s may therefore also be related to the recent literature on learning processes and changes in monetary policy regimes, as well as to the literature on 4 The Swedish monetary program of the 1930s as well as the work on monetary rules by Swedish economists like Knut Wicksell, David Davidson and Erik Lindahl attracted a considerable interest internationally in the 1930s. See Fisher (1935 Fisher ( , 1937 and Lester (1939) among others. It was "rediscovered" as part of the impact of monetarism and monetary history in the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) spirit in the 1970s, see Jonung (1979b) and (1981) . The present debate on inflation targeting and on rules versus discretion has contributed to a new interest in the Swedish 1930s. See for example Johnson and Keleher (1996) . Wicksell's rule for the conduct of monetary policy was a simple one: the central bank should raise its discount rate as long as prices were rising, lower it as long as prices were falling and keep it constant when the price level was stable. The key to price stabilization was thus found in the discount rate. This was the essence of the "cumulative process" as Wicksell's theory was later termed. Price stabilization was thus accomplished by interest rate policy. Monetary aggregates like the volume of credit, the monetary base, bank reserves or the stock of money did not play any major role in this framework. In addition,
Wicksell's scheme required a "free standard", that is a monetary system based on an inconvertible paper standard.
5 See King (1996) , Bordo and Jonung (1998) and Sargent (1998) . Sargent suggests an alternative to delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank with a legislated price stability goal. An adaptive model may open the way for a government to learn from past attempts to exploit the Phillips curve thereby eventually discovering a version of the natural rate hypothesis that instructs it to reduce inflation. See also Jonung (1998) Sweden followed the international pattern of leaving the gold standard at the outbreak of World War I. A paper standard was introduced and high inflation occurred, primarily at the end of the war. In the early 1920s a return to the gold standard at the prewar gold parity became the official goal of monetary policy, requiring a sharp deflation. The subsequent fall in prices contributed to a rapid rise in unemployment, huge output losses and social unrest.
As a result of the sharp fluctuations in Swedish prices, unemployment and production, the discussion of the policy of the Riksbank became exceedingly lively in the years prior to the re-establishment of the gold standard in the 1920s. Because of this exchange of ideas on monetary policy -to which the economists as well as representatives from the Riksbank and business contributed -the Swedish public became well acquainted with various monetary norms.
The economists held a strong position in public debate, highly respected and successful in a way difficult to apprehend today. 7 Gustav Cassel had his greatest impact in the 1920s, being regarded as the most influential economist in the world before being eclipsed by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s. 8 An
American observer noted that the Swedish public became "price-level minded" due to the energetic journalistic activity of the economists. 9 The strong position of the economics profession eventually paved the way for the adoption of the monetary program of 1931.
The second major force accounting for the price stabilization program was the monetary experience of the 1920s. Most Swedish economists were in favor of a return to the gold standard at the prewar parity in the early 1920s. They simply could not envisage the deep depression, the output losses and the rise of 6 For a modern interpretation of Lindahl´s views see Fregert (1993) . 7 The lively journalistic activities of the first generation of Swedish economists are described in Magnusson (1993) . 8 Cassel's address to the US Congress in 1927 is often regarded as the zenith of his career.
9 See Lester (1939, p. 226) , where he also stated: "In Sweden academic economists probably enjoy more respect and influence with the people and the government than anywhere else in the world." unemployment associated with the deflation process. In addition, unemployment remained at a high and persistent level throughout the 1920s. These events undermined the legitimacy of the gold standard and opened for a discussion of alternative monetary arrangements and policy norms. Swedish economists, notably Gustav Cassel, once a supporter of the gold standard, became critical of the workings of the interwar gold standard.
The world-wide depression starting in 1928 and manifested in falling prices and rising unemployment undermined the standing of the gold standard within academic circles in Sweden. When the depression hit Sweden in 1931 the ground was laid for the acceptance of alternatives to the gold standard. The depression became in this way a window of opportunity for the proponents of price stabilization.
The program of 1931
The full impact of the depression hit Sweden in 1931 through falling exports and a drain on its foreign reserves. Bank failures in Central Europe contributed to capital outflows from Sweden. When the Bank of England made its notes inconvertible to gold on September 19, 1931, speculators attacked the krona. In the following week the foreign holdings of the Riksbank declined rapidly. The Riksbank tried to obtain long term financing from New York and Paris to stay on gold but failed.
As a consequence of the speculative attack, the Board of the Riksbank asked at the end of the week the Government for permission to make Riksbank notes inconvertible into gold, evoking the escape clause in the constitution. The escape clause, as amended in 1915 after the gold suspension of 1914, allowed the Riksbank to suspend the gold convertibility of its notes in case of "severe money crises".
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In anticipation of the request by the Board, the Minister of Finance, Mr Felix Hamrin, turned to Gustav
Cassel on Saturday September 26 asking him to prepare a statement concerning the monetary position of Sweden to be used by the Government. Cassel accepted this task, toiling with it into the night, sending his proposal to Hamrin by messenger late Saturday.
10 From 1931 until 1974, the Riksdag granted annually the Riksbank exception from the requirement of redeeming its notes into gold. In 1974 the constitution was changed, cutting the link between gold and Riksbank notes. This step marked the end of the gold standard in Sweden from a purely legalistic point of view. See Fregert and Jonung (1996) . 11 The gold suspension of 1931 was the first and only occasion when the notes of the Riksbank were made inconvertible in a legal sense; all other suspensions have been illegal. See Fregert and Jonung (1996) .
On Sunday September 27 the Government met to decide on the request of the Board of the Riksbank.
Basically, it had no choice but to allow the Riksbank to leave the gold standard as the foreign reserves were depleted. In the declaration made public Sunday evening, the Minister of Finance, Felix Hamrin, first explained the chain of events leading to the decision of gold suspension. He put the blame on foreign developments and argued that the public finances of Sweden were in good order.
At the end of the declaration, the monetary program of price stabilization was announced; the domestic purchasing of the krona should be preserved "using all means available". 12 Apparently it was an economist, Gustav Cassel, who was instrumental in putting price stabilization into the announcement of the Swedish government demonstrating the influence of the economics profession on policy-making. 1) An immediate return to gold or a peg to the British pound should not to be considered, that is Sweden should maintain a flexible exchange rate for the krona for the time being. Efforts to control the value of the krona should start from the domestic price level and the "needs of Sweden's economy".
2) Continued deflation should be resisted just as strongly as the inflation was resisted that was expected when Sweden abandoned the gold standard.
3) Some recovery in prices would be desirable, though not a return to a "too distant" price level. Even domestic prices should be allowed to rise, not just export and import prices, provided this did not appreciably affect the cost of living. Price increases due to higher custom duties should be accepted as consistent with the monetary program.
4) Monetary policy should not be tied schematically to a particular index figure. Conducting monetary policy in the interest of the entire country involved considering so many factors that "a formal and simple rule" for monetary policy did not appear feasible.
12 Record of financial matters, done before the King-in-Council at Stockholm Palace on 27th September 1931. 13 The above description is taken from the autobiography by Cassel (1941, p 285) . Cassel noted that Hamrin did not show him any appreciation for this work. We cannot rule out that Hamrin used other advisors as well. Lester (1937 Lester ( , 1939 5) It was generally desirable that domestic interest rates were kept as low as was conceivably possible without jeopardizing the monetary policy objective.
In June 1933 the Riksdag approved a revised version of the monetary program. The major additional recommendation was stated in the following way:
6) The choice of means for reaching the monetary policy objective should rest entirely with the Riksbank, and the Riksbank should be allowed such liberty of action as is required for this purpose.
Swedish Economic Performance in the 1930s
As the monetary program as well as the evaluation of the program evolved was strongly influenced by actual economic events, we describe briefly the behavior of some major economic aggregates such as prices, interest rates, exchange rates, unemployment and production in the 1930s prior to World War II. Table A1 in Appendix A.) As the recommendations, given in three separate reports, of the three economists covered most of the issues that were debated subsequently, they are used here as the starting point for our account of the evolution of the monetary program. In addition, the reports most likely influenced the Riksbank in the 1930s. The views of the economists, in particular those of Cassel and Heckscher, were also made known to the public through newspaper articles and other contributions.
As seen from the following account the Riksbank should properly be described as an independent central bank towards the Government in the 1930s. 18 See for example the contributions in Leiderman and Svensson (1995) on the inflation targeting in five countries. 19 Record of financial matters, done before the King-in-Council at Stockholm Palace on 27th September 1931.
The three economists recommended that Sweden should maintain a "free standard" based on price stabilization as long as the world monetary system remained disorganized. There should be a rapid and immediate return at existing exchange rates to a gold standard or to an international monetary system, once international monetary stability had been restored. Initially, they viewed the monetary program of 1931 as a temporary arrangement while the world monetary system was in disarray.
The permanence of the program was considered a few months later by the Banking Committee in The Banking Committee declared in May 1932:
"Monetary policy since the departure from the gold standard and the Governing Board's actions to maintain the value of the currency seem to call for more detailed treatment, considering for instance that the statements, with which the Government concurs in these respects, could no doubt acquire the character of guidelines for our monetary policy in the immediate future ."
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As the international gold standard gradually dissolved in the 1930s, a return to gold became no longer a viable alternative for Sweden. Instead, the monetary program was maintained and gradually amended in various ways. Some economists actually started to view it as the first step towards a Swedish as well as international adoption of price stabilization as the proper norm for monetary policy -as an alternative to fixed exchange rate systems. This was the case of Irving Fisher (1934) and Erik Lindahl (1937) .
However, a younger group of Swedish economists, working within the Stockholm School approach, started to question the price stabilization program on theoretical as well as empirical grounds, eventually suggesting employment stabilization as a superior goal to price stabilization as seen below.
To sum up, the monetary program of 1931 was initially viewed as a temporary one by the government, the economists and the Riksbank. A return to a fixed exchange rate was regarded as the natural step, in particular by the Riksbank. The Riksbank tried unsuccessfully such a return already in November 1931 by 20 Banking Committee, Submission 6, February 1932, p. 3, italics are ours. pegging the krona to the pound at the old gold parity rate. The Riksbank made a new attempt in July 1933 that lasted until the outbreak of World War II. See Chart 3.
How was price stabilization defined?
In the 1990s all countries pursuing an explicit price stability target have chosen an explicit quantitative inflation target, either an interval or a point target, where the center of the interval or the point target varies across countries from 1.5 to 2.5 per cent per year. The target, thus, is set in terms of a rate change rather than of the price level. Several recent papers present arguments for preferring a target in terms of levels rather than rates of change, however.
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The price stability target adopted by the Riksbank in 1931-32 was a price level target, in contrast to the inflation target adopted by central banks in the 1990s. A price level target implies that a lower than target inflation rate in one period has to be offset by a correspondingly higher inflation rate in the following
period. An inflation target allows "base drift" in the price level: after each period, the actual price level is taken as the base for the inflation target of the next period, even if the inflation target for the base period was not met.
When the Finance Minister announced that monetary policy should be directed at "preserving the inversely with the growth in productivity. However, Hecksher felt the problem of choosing the proper norm was so complicated that the Riksbank should seek the advice of those who had studied it in great detail.
In his report, Cassel argued that Sweden must have an independently managed paper standard and that there could hardly be any other norm for this standard than the stabilization of the domestic purchasing power of the krona. He stated that the great advantage of the paper standard was that Sweden became isolated from the "destructive" deflation taking place in those countries still on gold. This ability of the paper standard to prevent the world deflation from spreading to Sweden should be regarded as the main reason why Sweden left the gold standard. According to Cassel, this goal had to be determined by the use of a quantitative measure of the purchasing power of the krona. His report suggests that Wicksell's norm should be adopted although he was not explicit on this issue.
Davidson considered two competing monetary norms for a free currency: first, a stable general price level, and second, a norm that -judging from his argument -was most likely the norm presently carrying his name. The first norm had the advantage of being simple and easy to follow for the monetary authorities although it was not the correct guideline for monetary policy in Davidson's opinion.
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The three economists all agreed that monetary policy under a paper standard should be focused solely on price stabilization. They did not consider any other goals for the Riksbank such as output or employment stabilization in their reports although written when Swedish industrial production was declining and unemployment was rising dramatically.
Judging from the official documents on monetary policy during the subsequent years, price stabilization was eventually defined as price level targeting. In April 1932 the Governing Board of the Riksbank stated that it was expected that in the first place, as in other countries, the departure from the gold standard would start a process of inflation. The declared monetary policy program was " intended to calm such fears". On the other hand, the Board said, "the program was intended to prevent the price level in
Sweden from following the downward international price trend".
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In May 1932, the Banking Committee considered the criticism that had been directed at the monetary policy program. On the one hand there had been fairly sharp criticism of the Riksbank's interest rate policy and its credit restrictions, which had been considered to impose excessively heavy burdens on the 23 Why did not Davidson recommend the norm now carrying his name? His reply hints at a "better" norm than price stabilization but he argues that knowledge is lacking concerning this norm. Perhaps the decline in wholesale prices preceding the gold suspension of the Riksbank and the deepening of the depression made it difficult for Davidson to suggest a norm that would imply falling prices. In the 1930s the Swedish authorities was facing the choice of proper price index to select as target variable for the new monetary program. In his reply to the Riksbank questionnaire, Heckscher's choice was the price of goods domestically produced. As a matter of principle the Riksbank could stabilize an average price level consisting of exports, imports and non-tradable domestic goods. In the prevailing situation this would, however, be to ask "too much" of monetary policy.
According to Cassel, the choice was between the stabilization of either the wholesale prices or of the cost of living. Cassel argued that a stabilization of the cost of living would be favorably received by the general public. He also suggested that a "broader" measure of the purchasing power of the krona than the cost-of-living index should be, preferably computed on a weekly basis. Furthermore, the Bank should adopt this general index as a guide for its policy, paying attention to indices for separate groups of goods only under "special circumstances".
Concerning the selection of price index to be used by the Bank, Davidson suggested that "due attention"
should be given to every kind of index since so little was presently known about this issue. He advised the Bank to explain in great detail how its price index was constructed because such knowledge would facilitate an analysis of actual price movements. The Bank ought to use its price data for two purposes, first, and most importantly, to measure the impact of monetary policy and, second, to inform the Bank about future developments, that is to use it as an indicator.
The Riksbank started to calculate a consumer price index on a weekly basis after the announcement of the price stabilization norm in the autumn of 1931. The consumer price index was constructed at the statistical department at the Riksbank with the assistance by the board of trade and the Royal Social
Board. 28 See Chart 1 and Chart 2.
The aim of the Riksbank index was to register at short intervals in the most generally comprehensible and widely applicable way possible the influence of Swedish monetary policy with regard to the internal purchasing power of the krona, for the information both of the directors of the Bank of Sweden and the Swedish public.
27 In New Zealand, for example, the types of shocks that are disregarded are specified in the agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, which explicitly refers to e.g. significant changes in terms of trade. 28 Information on CPI is from Lindahl (1933) .
A weekly table of the whole commodity price system, a weekly index of the average retail prices of consumer goods and of services were produced. The index number was calculated to detect as far as possible both the origin of price changes and their importance for agriculture and industry. By comparing various quotations it was possible to decide how far an internal price movement was dependent upon foreign price changes or an alteration in the exchange rate, and to what extent it was founded on internal conditions, for example, on a change in domestic demand. Data were assembled from fifteen localities to
show the retail price of goods and services, which were considered representative of consumption within the entire country.
The index was subject to a constant process of re-sampling so as to adjust it to fundamental changes taking place in the commodity and service markets. The components of the index were thus altered as the need for change arose. The weighting of each component part was changed from time to time so as to reflect, as far as feasible, the direction of effective consumer demand.
However, the Board of the Riksbank did not tie monetary policy solely to its consumer price index. In
February 1932, the Board of the Riksbank pointed out that when forming its policy in view of fluctuations in the price level the Riksbank could not but take into account the causes of such changes in prices. It was considered essential to determine whether price movements were caused, e.g., by increased tariffs, altered exchange rates or a tendency to inflation on the domestic market which could be looked upon as primary in relation to exchange rates. In any such analysis of price conditions, naturally " other price indices besides the Riksbank's own index of consumer prices will also be taken into consideration ."
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The citation above clearly indicates that the Board did not want the price norm to be formulated only in terms of the CPI-index. The explicit role of indirect taxes when calculating the index figures was also taken into consideration. For example, in May 1932, the Governing Board noted:
"That the course of registered price movements has followed the Board's guidelines should be evident from the appended In January 1993 when the Riksbank announced its adoption of an inflation target, it also declared a transition period of two years by stating that the inflation target was to be effective starting in January 1995 34
. The Riksbank specified that the objective of monetary policy is to limit the annual increase in the consumer price index in 1995 and onwards to 2 per cent, with a degree of tolerance of ± 1 per cent. This objective corresponded to the underlying rate of inflation when the target was announced. In 1993 and 1994 monetary was to aim at preventing the inflationary impulse due to the depreciation of the krona and changes in indirect taxes from causing an increase in the underlying rate of inflation. Thus the Riksbank did not suggest a particular level of the CPI as the starting point of inflation targeting, it referred rather to the underlying inflation as a form of a nominal anchor during the interim period.
In September 1931 when the krona was taken off gold, prices had been falling since 1928 -see Chart 1.
The discussion therefore centered around the issue of an appropriate level at which prices should be stabilized. A major question was the following one: which point of time should be chosen as the base for the program of price stabilization? Heckscher settled for the average price level of the third quarter of 1931. He argued that a return to the price level of 1928-29 -before the fall in prices -was not to be recommended on two counts; first, the inflation required for such a purpose would create requests for higher nominal wages, perhaps giving rise to an increasing real wage, second, and most important, it was extremely difficult to manage a free standard when prices were rising since rising prices would contributed to speculation.
Should monetary policy aim at changing the relationship between various indices, particularly between the wholesale price index and the cost-of-living index? (Chart 2 shows a more rapid fall in wholesale prices than in the cost of living index.) Heckscher answered in the negative. As monetary policy could not do anything in this field, the Riksbank should ignore any disparate movements of individual indices in the past. This recommendation did not mean that the present relationship between the cost-of-living and wholesale price index was the desirable or the proper one -only that it was not the task of monetary policy to make such adjustments according to Heckscher.
Cassel believed that the "normal equilibrium" between these two price indices did not exist at present.
Cassel argued that a stabilization of the cost of living at the level prevailing in mid-1931 would be favorably received by the general public. In Cassel's opinion, wholesale prices and the cost of living price index had to converge before any stabilization could take place. He stressed that the wholesale price index had declined by 25.6 per cent from the average level of 1928 to July 1931 while the cost-of-living index had declined by only 8.7 per cent in the same period. A slight rise in wholesale prices was the best way to accomplish convergence between the two series, as a lowering of the cost of living would reduce nominal wage rates and cause social unrest. Thereafter a stabilization of the cost of living at the level prevailing in mid-1931 would be preferable, according to Cassel. Davidson gave no advice on this matter.
The relationship between wholesale and consumer prices as discussed by the economists remained an issue throughout the 1930s. In January 1932 the Finance Minister repeated that the aim should still be to maintain the purchasing power of the krona. However, he also noted that " "When in May 1932, the Banking Committee of the Riksdag met...the internal wholesale price level ought to be raised, in so far as this could be done without also seriously affecting the cost of living. Swedish retail prices and wages had not fallen as drastically as had the wholesale price level, so that the gap between wholesale and retail prices had become abnormally wide. By raising wholesale prices, while maintaining the retail price level, it was hoped to correct this disequilibrium. At the same time this procedure was to make production profitable again". Except for the report by Davidson and Heckscher, we have found no explicit reference to forward-looking policy rules. Neither were any explicit quantitative inflation forecasts made at the Riksbank. 42 The intention of the Board of the Riksbank was to endeavor to maintain more or less unaltered the average level of prices of domestic and consumer goods. A monetary policy along these lines was compatible with a certain rise in the Riksbank's index as prices of certain import and export goods were expected to increase. The Banking Committee then added that even domestic market prices should be allowed to rise, not just export and import prices, provided this did not appreciably affect the cost of living. This can be interpreted as a provisional short-term specification of a price stability target which in the long run aims at price stability. The reason for this interpretation is that wholesale prices since 1928 had fallen much 39 Lindahl, however, in 1933, constructed a measure of underlying inflation, which was the Riksbank index adjusted for changes in indirect taxes and seasonal variations, which showed that even retail prices were falling in 1931 and 1932, though less rapidly than between 1928 and 1931. 40 According to another observer "the objective of the program became diffuse and indefinite". See Lester (1939, p. 233 ). Lester also said that "Riksbank officials in deciding their policies more or less disregarded the Bank´s retail price index". "During the nine months prior to April 1933 the Riksbank´s index declined at a rate three-quarters as rapid as its fall during the nine months before Sweden abandoned gold." "Although the officials of the Bank kept an eye on the price level, they directed their policy according to other criteria" Lester (1939, p. 233) . 41 See Fisher (1935, p. 322) . He also gave a positive evaluation: "The official cost of living index (which alone the Riksbank undertook to stabilize) kept remarkably stable. Starting with 100 in September, it never rose higher than 101.7 and never fell below 98.4, for thirty-five months...In other words, it ranged from 1.7% above to 1.6% below, the chosen par. " Fisher (1935, p. 324) . 42 However, Lindahl in 1934 pointed out that it was very suitable to link a monetary program to a consumer price index because more definite conclusions could then be drawn regarding the " future development of prices", see Lindahl(1934, p.169-181) more than retail prices. However, the possibility of raising domestic wholesale prices, without bringing about an increase in the cost of living, recommended by Cassel and later supported by Fisher, was questioned by Heckscher.
The idea of a lagged introduction of the new monetary program did not occur in the 1930s. Price stabilization was to take place at once. As policies emerged the September 1931 price level was adopted as the starting point although various requests were made in the following years for a rise in the wholesale price index.
Who should set the goal of monetary policy?
Modern research on central bank independence draws a distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. 43 A central bank has goal independence when it is free to set the final goals for monetary policy (e.g. decide that price stability is less important than output stability), while a bank that has instrument independence is free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals.
Much suggests that the goal of price stabilization announced in September 1931 acted as an important restriction on monetary policy, while the Riksbank actually was more interested in maintaining stable exchange rates than maintaining the internal purchasing power of the krona. Minister were more influential, however.
In the report by Heckscher, he discussed whether any constitutional guarantees could be adopted for the paper standard similar to those once found in the Swedish law pertaining to the gold standard. Heckscher 43 Debelle and Fischer (1994) 44 See Jonung (1979b) was pessimistic about the feasibility of such guarantees since the paper standard lacked those simple points of references of the gold standard that made it easy to see if the rules of the system were followed.
Still, Heckscher was of the opinion that attempts ought to be made to anchor the paper standard in the law, suggesting that in due time it would be possible to find better points of references than those presently available.
One possible approach would be to legally force the central bank to maintain a stable price level.
However, this approach was probably dangerous to adopt, according to Heckscher, since, first, it would
give constitutional status to the weights of a given price index which would not adjust to continuous changes in the economy, and, second, one specific price index was in any case an inadequate point of reference for monetary policy. At best, the law could prescribe some maximum allowable deviations around a fixed level of a price index or of a combination of price indices. However, at this juncture no legal regulations should be introduced.
At any rate, the Swedish authorities should publicly declare their firm commitment to the principles of the new monetary system and preferably also state explicitly that the foreign value of the krona and the "The Riksbank should be given no directions as to its monetary policy beyond such as indicate the objectives of that policy. The choice of means for reaching this objective should rest entirely with the Riksbank, and the Riksbank should be allowed such liberty of action as is required for this purpose. In regard to public financial demands on the Riksbank, the latter's complete independence should be maintained."
The monetary policy program finally approved by parliament implied that the Riksbank's position can be described as goal dependent but instrument independent.
The goal was covered by the five aspects decided on in May 1932, but the instruments were chosen at the Riksbank's discretion as indicated by the aspect added in June 1933. This meant that besides the standard monetary policy instruments, the Riksbank also intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to prevent an excessively strong increase in exchange rates and to smooth minor exchange rate movements. 47 Banking Committee, Submission no. 40, May 1932, p. 14. 48 Kjellström (1934, p. 36) Here Heckscher argued that movements in wholesale prices should be used for the purpose of making forecasts for directing monetary policy and that fluctuations in retail prices should be adopted as a measure of the actual effects of monetary policy -as a "verification" according to his report.
Kjellström presented an index of raw material commodity prices moinitored during this period and stated that "the Bank of Sweden makes use of wholesale indices published by the commercial banks and the Royal Board of Trade, as well as the price series relating to raw materials and products to guide its monetary policy". 49 Since Swedish exports largely consisted of commodities and export prices were closely monitored, commodity prices undoubtedly played an important role as indictor for monetary policy during this period.
The foreign exchange rate had a prominent role as a monetary guide during the 1930s. Swedish economists and policymakers recognized that movements in exchange rates affected prices in an open economy. However, there was also an insight that given a purposeful Swedish monetary policy, it was to be expected that the domestic value of the Swedish krona would also determine the foreign exchange rates.
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Partly because of an underdeveloped Swedish bond market and the fact that Swedish economists had not spelled out a theory of the bank rate/long bond spread, this yield was not employed as a policy indicator during the price stabilization period. Under present circumstances it was obvious that central banks needed knowledge "about the domestic business cycle and the world business cycle", however. The modern central bank thus should recruit a new 49 Kjellström (1934, p. 49) 50 See the statement by the finance minister in record of financial matters, done before the King-in-Council at Stockholm Palace on 27th September 1931. 51 Montgomery (1938, p.45-46) . type of employee, namely that of the economic advisor, in charge of analyzing domestic and international economic events according to Hammarskjöld (1935, p. 6) . He pointed at the Bank of England as a forerunner in this field.
Hammarskjöld's lecture gives a reason why the Riksbank did not use any inflation forecasts. The Bank simply lacked the expertise capable of producing forecasts in the modern sense. The econometric techniques and the statistical data used presently for inflation forecasting did not exist at the time.
How was the price level targeting monitored?
To make monetary policy transparent under the inflation target regime that was announced in 1993, the Riksbank communicates with financial market participants and the public by speeches, inflation reports and other publications
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. The inflation report is the most important policy document and is published four times a year. The purpose of the report is to provide a basis for monetary policy decisions and make the Riksbank's deliberations known to a wider public. The inflation reports contain an account of the inflation forecast, in terms of both the consumer price index and the underlying rate of inflation, and of monetary policy as well as an assessment of alternative risk scenarios.
Other important channels for monetary policy communication, besides the inflation reports, are the speeches by the Governor and Deputy Governors. In addition the Governor appears before the public in hearings in the Committee on Finance of the Parliament.
In the 1930s, the Riksdag supervised and monitored the activities of the Riksbank, primarily through the annual report of the Riksbank submitted in early January to the Banking Committee of the Riksdag. Next, Monetary policy was also evaluated in bills put forth by the government. These bills were drafted within the Ministry of Finance. The political opposition also proposed legislation concerning the policy of the Riksbank. The main monitoring of the Riksbank thus occurred through the political process.
52 See Berg and Gröttheim (1997) The Riksbank was also continuously monitored in the financial press and by the economics profession.
Cassel, Heckscher and Ohlin among others commented frequently on the program of price stabilization, often being critical of the policy of the Riksbank. This criticism was taken seriously by the Riksbank. It had to pay attention to the views of outsiders as these could be picked up the Government and by Parliament. A change in the internal purchasing power of the krona favorable to Sweden's economy would probably be most easily and most advantageously accomplished in connection with a rise of the world price level.
Evaluations of the Price
Sweden should accordingly make a point of keeping pace with such a development and associate herself at the World Economic Conference in London with any efforts made to attain that end.
On the other hand, if such a strategy would not be possible, Sweden would have to continue to pursue an independent monetary policy. In that case the aim should be to arrest any tendency to a fall in prices. In addition to this, the goal of an independent Swedish monetary policy should be to bring about a moderate rise of the internal wholesale price level . Such a rise would not have any major effect on retail prices as they reacted slowly to changes in wholesale prices. "The price rise for imported goods was thus countered in the initial period up to the autumn of 1932 by the price fall for export goods, which had to do with conditions in markets abroad, while home market prices were virtually unchanged, possibly somewhat below the level that prevailed in September 1931.
Since the autumn of 1932 the price index for all commodity groups has fallen, though in recent months the decline has been less pronounced. The downward tendency was broken in April but it seems that this improvement in the price situation has essentially favored home market and export goods, while import prices continued to fall. The price movements described here show that the fears of a loss of purchasing power for the krona that were expressed when the gold standard was abandoned have not been confirmed. On the contrary, the price fall has not entirely ceased, still less has there been the price recovery that was mentioned in the report for 1932 from the Banking committee." Turning to interest rate movements, the Minister of Finance stressed that the cuts in the discount rate in 1932 had not been fully effective in that the commercial banks only altered the discount rate for commercial bills. At the turn of 1932, however, the commercial banks had also reduced their lending rates. When Sweden left the gold standard in the autumn of 1931, the strength of the downward price effects in the global economy had been underestimated, according to him. Attention was concentrated solely on preventing an expected bout of inflation. In the spring of 1932 easing of the monetary stance would suffice for some recovery in prices. The subsequent development showed that, by themselves, discount rate cuts and easier capital conditions were not sufficient to stimulate a price rise. 54 Quoted from Government Bill 260, p. 9.
The experts' report , however, had drawn attention to the fact that the Riksbank did not lack ways of intervening more actively, which linked up with the alternatives for financing public works to counter unemployment. Considering what the experts had stated, the Minister was of the opinion that the possibilities of exerting an appreciable influence on the domestic price level were no doubt greater than indicated by the Riksbank's Board of Directors. These opportunities should be utilized to the extent needed to achieve a moderate increase in the domestic price level.
Finally, the Finance Minister was of the opinion that attention must also be paid to preventing a price rise above the stated limits. If the downward price tendencies had been underestimated in the autumn of 1931, there could now be a temptation not to pay sufficient attention to the inflationary tendencies that could be released by a general upturn in global activity.
In Riksbank's policy, like economic policy in general, should now focus on trying to restrain the price rise and at least prevent an inflationary tendency. The Board thought that, as far as possible, the Riksbank should maintain the stability of Sweden's currency. Considering that the economic situation is changeable 55 Landgren (1960, p.13) 56 Included in Banking Committee, Submission no. 67, 21 May 1937, p.2 at short notice, so that an amendment of the program may be needed, the Board requested that the directives be formulated in general terms and applied to a limited period.
Simultaneously, the Minister of Finance noted that the depression had given way to a pronounced boom.
The price fall had been succeeded by a price rise that proceeded slowly in the early years within narrow limits but had accelerated markedly since the preceding autumn, so that wholesale prices were close to the level before the outbreak of the depression. He stressed that monetary policy should aim for a certain stability in the price level. But other factors must also be allowed to intrude; monetary policy was to be an instrument for promoting "the smooth progress of economic activities and providing as much employment as possible for the nation's productive forces".
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Ernst Wigforss also pointed out that the "reflation policy" (eliminating the effects of the preceeding "deflation") had been the characteristic feature of monetary and exchange rate policy in recent years. The sterling peg in 1933 was not a departure from the directives; the fixed exchange rate to the pound implied that the level of Swedish wholesale prices was linked to the slow increase in British wholesale price, which facilitated "reflation".
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Furthermore, the basic idea that price stability was the primary objective stood firm but "reflation" was no longer desirable, according to the Finance Minister. The level of wholesale prices had already risen by more than the "moderate increase" that had been intended originally. Both the Riksbank's policy and general economic policy should focus on restricting the price rise, at least preventing an inflationary tendency. It was then inevitable that the question of stabilizing the external value of the krona must remain a secondary matter.
59
Concerning monetary policy instruments, the Minister of Finance had pointed out that the Riksbank's primary instrument was the discount rate on bills of exchange. An increase in this rate was likely to be effective only if it was supported by open market operations, perhaps together with an increase in minimum reserves. As an emergency precaution, the Riksdag had authorized the National Debt Office to provide the Riksbank with Treasury bills or other debt instruments for market operations.
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The Minister then noted that the price rise was due to three factors: agricultural policy, external price increases and increased domestic demand. Agricultural policy was a special case, deliberately constructed this marked not the end of the price stability norm of the 1930s but rather the beginning of the end.
Evaluation by Economists
The policy of the Riksbank was closely followed, commented on and criticized by the economics Lester (1939, p. 238) The first group consisted of the older generation of economists, influenced by the monetary events of World War I. They were liberal in their general outlook and critical of government intervention. Cassel, Heckscher and Lindahl belonged to this group. They remained throughout the 1930s proponents of price stabilization and turned into critics of the new ideas of the younger generation.
The second group was made up of the new generation of economists that was making its way in the 1930s. They were influenced by the high and persistent unemployment of the 1930s. To them the challenge was to develop theories and policies to reduce unemployment and the fluctuations of the business cycle. They became early proponents of government intervention and "active" countercyclical policies. This group was later termed the Stockholm School. Inadequacy of Price Stabilization". Here Ohlin was of the opinion that the Riksbank had failed in preventing a fall of wholesale and consumer prices. In addition, the price stabilization program had not prevented a decline in demand, in production, in real national income and in domestic investment according to Ohlin (1933) . According to him: "on the whole, then, we may say that, when once a depression has set in, a reduction in the quantities produced and marketed can very easily take place without being materially reflected in the index numbers presenting the average wholesale or retail price level."
On the other hand, Ohlin (1933, p. 264) thought that the monetary program had been beneficial to Sweden by preventing a further decline in prices. "The fatal spiral of deflation was avoided in Sweden."
However, in his conclusions Ohlin thought price stabilization was insufficient. Instead, he recommended a "konjunkturpolitik" that aims at as full and regular utilization of the productive forces as possible,".
Ohlin thus proposed employment stabilization rather than price stabilization. Here Ohlin was recommending a stabilization policy program that eventually spelt the end of the monetary program.
6. Conclusions 65 The diverging views on macroeconomic issues between the old and young generation of Swedish economists in the 1930s is dealt with in the introduction of Jonung (1992). Cassel's and Heckscher´s resistance towards "the new economics" is examined by Carlson (1992) . The price stability target adopted by the Riksbank in 1931-32 was a price level target, in contrast to the inflation targets adopted by several central banks in the 1990s. With a price level target the longer-term variance, and hence uncertainty, about prices are smaller. According to one prominent observer, the chief disadvantage of a price level target is that the monetary authority is attempting to deflate the economy half the time, thus creating more uncertainty about short-term inflation rates than with an inflation target.
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However, in a model with persistence in output (due to price-stickiness, for instance), price level targeting results in lower short-run inflation variability than inflation targeting.
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In 1932 the fears of inflation expressed when Sweden left the gold standard was replaced by a clear concern of continued deflation. The strength of the downward price effects in the global economy had probably been underestimated. By raising wholesale prices, while maintaining the retail price level, it was hoped to correct the disequilibrium between wholesale prices and the cost of living index that had developed 1928-1931, before the Bank began to stabilize prices. Although continued deflation should be resisted just as strongly as inflation, some recovery in prices was desirable, though not a return to a "unduly distant" price level. This part of the program was successfully implemented. In 1937 wholesale prices were close to the level at the end of 1928, while the consumer price index had been relatively stable since 1931. This suggests that the price level target contributed to a low variability of consumer prices during the recovery from the depression. An important lesson from the early Swedish experience is also that a price stability target can be used to raise inflation expectations when there are fears of deflation.
What was overlooked in the Swedish experiment with price-level targeting? According to the modern view on monetary policy, there is a considerable lag before monetary measures affect inflation. For this reason, monetary policy has to be forward-looking. In particular, the assessment of future inflation will be central. In practice, the part played by the inflation forecast is so vital that it resembles an intermediate target for inflation targeting central banks, see King (1994) and Svensson (1997) . Central banks should pursue monetary policy so that the inflation forecast for an appropriate horizon is in line with the inflation target.
In contrast, we have not found any references to explicit forward looking policy rules used in the 1930s by the Riksbank. Some of the Swedish economists were insightful as to the use of forecasts, but in practice it seems as if the Riksbank and its principals were primarily concerned with the actual price level. The lack of any expertise on forecasting within the Riksbank may account for this state of affairs.
The monetary program adopted in 1931-1932 can be seen as a means to set a price-level target for a goaldependent but instrument-independent central bank. The Riksdag stressed that the Riksbank should be given no directions as to its monetary policy beyond such as indicated by the objective of that policy.
However, the program was not given a legal backing. Even though the original goal of stable prices was 67 Under inflation targeting, according to the model by Svensson (1997c) , the decision rule is a linear feed-back rule for inflation on the output gap and the variance of inflation is proportional to the variance of the output gap. Under price level targeting, the decision rule is a linear feed-back rule for the price level on the output gap. Then inflation is a linear function of the first difference of the output gap and the variance of inflation is proportional to the variance of the first difference of the output gap.
maintained throughout the 1930s, adjustments and additional goals were added by requests from the Parliament and the Minister of Finance as the depression worsened. In 1932 the goal to preserve the domestic purchasing power of the krona was adjusted as both import prices and domestic market prices were allowed to increase. The Riksbank was also asked to keep interest rates as low as possible without jeopardizing the monetary policy objective. In 1933 the Riksbank was asked to "intervene more actively"
and "link" its monetary policy measures with fiscal policy measures to combat unemployment. In 1937 the Riksbank, in addition to the primary target to preserve a stable price level, was given other goals like aiming for full employment. Chart 3. Exchange rate Kr/Pound (1928-1930 annual data, 1931-1938 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 16 Chart 4. Discount rate (1928-1930 annual data, 1931-1938 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I.
A. Under which international conditions would it be appropriate for the Swedish monetary system to be tied to monetary conditions in other countries.
B. Which arguments can be advanced for tying the krona 1) to an international currency, primarily to a gold standard, and 2) to a given foreign currency?
C. Which should be the basic conditions for a transition or return to such a system? Should the exchange rate of the krona be set equal to the old parity to gold, or to a given foreign currency, as for example the pound, or to some other rate, more recently attained?
D. Should such a transition be instituted as a temporary step, subject to possible changes, or should it come about in a single once-and-for-all reform?
E. Which norms should guide the discount policy and the foreign exchange policy of the Riksbank in lieu of such a transition or return?
F. How should domestic price stability be realized under present circumstances? Should the goal of price stabilization be expressed in terms of wholesale or retail prices or in terms of the cost of living, in import and/or export prices, or in still some other way?
II. Which means are available to the Riksbank to accomplish a) a transition to b) and preservation of the proposed system? Is there a need for any powers that the Riksbank a) presently lacks or b) presently does not use?
III. Which other questions should preferably be considered in connection with the future organization of the Swedish monetary system? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Event:
Date: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Riksbank requests the Government to relieve it from the requirement to convert its notes into gold at demand following a week of large gold and capital outflows 28-9-1931 The Riksbank seeks the advice of Cassel, Davidson and Heckscher 8-10-1931 The Riksbank fails to peg the Krona to the pound at the gold parity rate of 18:15 November 1931
The death of Ivar Kreuger in Paris sets of liquidity crises for the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget. 
